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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY ROSS BOREN, : 
Case No. 900161 
Petitioner/Appellant : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
GARY W. DELAND, Director, Utah : 
State Dept. of Corrections; 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus involving a conviction of second degree murder, a 
first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-2 (3)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
STATgflENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court correctly ruled as a matter 
of law that petitioner's opportunity to rebut the presentence 
report was waived by counsel? A trial court's statement of law 
or legal conclusion is afforded no deference and is reviewed for 
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (4) (Interim Supp. 1984): 
(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for 
an offense for which probation may be 
granted, the court may, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, continue the date for the 
imposition of sentence for a reasonable 
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence report on the defendant• The 
report shall be prepared by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole. The report shall 
include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from 
adult probation and parole regarding the 
payment of restitution by the defendant. The 
contents of the report shall be confidential. 
The court may disclose all or parts of the 
report to the defendant or his counsel as the 
interest of justice requires. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony 
or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney may wish to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This 
testimony or information shall be presented 
in open court on record and in the presence 
of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff pled guilty to second degree murder, a first 
degree felony, on April 16, 1984, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding (R. 32-38). Plaintiff was 
sentenced on May 17, 1984, to serve an indeterminate term of 5 
years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 40-43). 
On August 20, 1987, defendant filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Plea of Guilty and a brief memorandum in support of his 
motion (R. 45-48). In his motion, plaintiff asserted that his 
defense counsel failed to disclose to him the contents and 
information contained in the presentence report (Id..). After an 
evidentiary hearing held October 28, 1987, Judge Frank G. Noel, 
Third District Court Judge, denied plaintiff's motion concluding 
that plaintiff freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea 
of guilty to second degree murder (R. 50-54). 
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On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
in an unpublished opinion filed October 11, 1989. State v. 
Boren, No. 890328-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1989) (unpublished 
opinion) (see Addendum "A"; Opinion). This Court denied 
plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 22, 1990. 
In a separate action, plaintiff filed a Petition for 
Postconviction Relief in the Third Judicial District Court on 
March 16, 1988, claiming that his guilty plea was affected by 
defense counsel's non-disclosure of the contents of the 
presentence report (R. 72-75). The petition was dismissed by 
Judge Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988, as an attempt to circumvent 
the regular appellate process (R. 76-80). Plaintiff did not 
appeal the dismissal of the petition. 
On September 26, 1989, plaintiff filed the Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus which is the subject of this appeal (R. 2-
16). At a hearing on the petition held on January 12, 1990, 
Third District Court Judge Scott Daniels summarily dismissed as 
frivolous plaintiff's claims regarding alleged pre-guilty plea 
1 2 
Miranda and search and seizure violations (R. 127-28). After 
supplemental briefing and taking the matter under advisement, 
Judge Daniels entered an order on March, 27, 1990, denying 
plaintiff's final claim that a constitutional error occurred when 
x
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 
A transcript of the January 12, 1990 hearing has not been 
provided on appeal. 
his attorney waived an opportunity to rebut the presentence 
report (R. 136-38). (See Addendum "B"; Order). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 15, 1983, plaintiff called a 911 telephone 
operator to report that his wife, Eliva Boren, was having 
3 
difficulty breathing (R. 62). Robert Staley, a Salt Lake City 
detective, responded to the call and upon arriving at plaintiff's 
residence discovered Eliva in a crouched position in the bedroom 
(Id.). Multiple bruises covered her entire body and she appeared 
to be dead (Id.). 
Medical examination of Eliva confirmed her death and 
revealed that the cause of death was "blunt force trauma" and 
could not have been self-inflicted (Ld.). Medical examination 
also concluded that the cause of death, a probable beating, 
occurred on or before September 10, 1983 and September 13, 1983, 
at least two to five days prior to plaintiff's 911 call (Id.). 
Holly Bollschweile, age 26, and Karen Boren, age 9, 
were residing at plaintiff's home at the time of the victim's 
death (Id.). Both of them stated that on or about September 13, 
1983, plaintiff entered the victim's bedroom and locked the 
bedroom door (Ici.). They heard sounds of plaintiff beating the 
victim (jld.). They also said they had heard plaintiff beating 
the victim on prior occasions (Id.). 
On September 19, 1983, plaintiff was arrested and 
charged with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in 
The facts of the crime are taken from the Brief of Respondent 
in State v. Boren, No. 890328-CA. 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b)(Supp. 1983) 
(Id.)- On April 16# 1984, plaintiff entered a plea of "guilty" 
to an amended information charging second degree murder under 
subsection (c), the depraved indifference subsection (R. 63). 
Judge Jay E. Banks sentenced defendant to a term of five years to 
life in the Utah State Prison (R. 40-43). Plaintiff did not 
appeal his conviction and sentence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court properly denied defendant's 
postconviction claim that constitutional error occurred when his 
presentence report was unconditionally provided to his counsel, 
but not directly to him, prior to sentencing. Because counsel 
was provided a copy of the presentence report and permitted to 
discuss the contents with defendant, the sentencing court did not 
err. Defendant does not claim counsel was ineffective for not 
discussing the presentence report with him, but instead argues 
that the sentencing court was required to provide a copy of the 
report directly to defendant. However, no such requirement 
exists, nor would it be judicially provident. 
The lower Court properly dismissed as frivolous and 
successive defendant's claim of a pre-guilty plea Miranda 
violation. In any event, defendant waived any Miranda violation 
claim by pleading guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OCCURRED WHEN 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY WAIVED AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
REBUT THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
On appeal, as in the lower court, plaintiff claims that 
his sentence was constitutionally defective because a copy of his 
presentence report was disclosed to his counsel but not to him 
prior to sentencing. (See Brief of Appellant at 6). Notably, he 
does not claim that his counsel was precluded from disclosing the 
contents of the report, but rather that his counsel simply did 
not show him the report. Neither does plaintiff claim that his 
counsel acted incompetently. In sum, plaintiff claims that he 
had a fundamental right to his own copy of his presentence report 
and that the district court could not rely on defense counsel to 
disclose the report to plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim should be 
rejected. 
Plaintiff seeks postconviction relief under Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 65B(i). To be successful, plaintiff must 
establish a substantial denial of his rights under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(l). 
At the time of plaintiff's conviction and sentence, 
statutory law provided that the "contents of the [presentence] 
report shall be confidential. The court may disclose all or 
parts of the report to the defendant or his counsel as the 
interest of justice requires." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) 
(Interim Supp. 1984)(emphasis added). This discretionary 
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language was subsequently deleted from the statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1990). 
Previously, this Court had clearly stated that 
procedural fairness requires that all parts of a presentence 
report be disclosed to a defendant or counsel prior to 
sentencing, except when disclosure of information may jeopardize 
the life or safety of third persons. State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005, 1008 (Utah 1982); State v. Lipskyf 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 
(Utah 1980). In Casarez, this Court indicated that because 
sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the 
failure to allow a defendant's counsel sufficient opportunity to 
read and investigate a presentence report may be equivalent to a 
denial of access to counsel. Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007-08. 
In the present case, the presentence report was 
disclosed to plaintiff's counsel prior to sentencing in 
accordance with Casarez. It is undisputed that plaintiff's 
counsel had an opportunity to read and investigate the 
presentence report. It is also undisputed that counsel had an 
opportunity to refute the information in the presentence report. 
Apparently, he chose not to do so. 
The remaining question is whether the opportunity to 
rebut a presentence report may be waived by counsel's silence, or 
in other words, must be personally waived by a defendant. As 
petitioner's representative before the sentencing court, defense 
counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report for 
accuracy and raise challenges if necessary. It is axiomatic that 
a represented party is generally deemed to be informed of a 
matter when the trial court unconditionally informs the party's 
counsel. The criminal justice system depends upon the principle 
that a defense attorney is a defendant's agent before the court. 
In fact, relatively few constitutional rights cannot be waived by 
counsel. See State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1989) 
(e.g., right to trial, right to be present at trial, right to 
trial by jury, and the right to an interpreter at trial). In 
Butterfield, this Court held that the failure of defendant or his 
counsel to object to the exclusion of the public from the 
courtroom constituted a waiver of defendant's right to a public 
trial. 
Analogous to Butterfield, defendant's counsel in the 
present case was provided a copy of the presentence report. 
While defendant alleges that his counsel did not review the 
report with him, there is no allegation that counsel was 
precluded from doing so. Counsel's silence regarding the 
accuracy of the report constituted a waiver of an objection to 
the report. It is generally accepted that "[djecisions as to ... 
what objections to make ... are generally left to the 
professional judgment of counsel." State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1989). Notably, plaintiff did not argue in the 
lower court, nor does he argue on appeal, that counsel's failure 
to rebut the presentence report constituted ineffective 
assistance. 
In sum, procedural fairness requires that a presentence 
report be disclosed to the defendant or his counsel. If it is 
disclosed to counsel and no objections are raised, the trial 
court is not obligated to inquire whether counsel has disclosed 
or discussed the report with the defendant. The trial court may 
rely upon the attorney/client relationship to effectively inform 
the defendant of the contents of the report. To rule otherwise 
would unnecessarily intrude upon the attorney/client relationship 
and require a defendant's personal waiver in mere procedural 
matters. 
POINT II 
BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLAINTIFF WAIVED ALL NON-
JURISDICTIONAL, PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS. 
Plaintiff also claims that information contained in his 
presentence report was illegally seized in violation of his 
Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). As 
a result, he complains that the Board of Pardons has relied on 
this illegally seized information in determining his length and 
conditions of confinement. 
The lower court granted the State's motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's Miranda claim on the basis that it constituted a 
frivolous claim in a successive postconviction petition (R. 127-
28). Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(g); Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1988). Because petitioner does not allege "good cause" for 
filing a successive petition, this Court need not consider 
plaintiff's claim. 
In any event, it is well-settled that by pleading 
guilty, a defendant waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
4 
While plaintiff does not specify the nature of this supposed 
illegally seized information, it appears to be plaintiff's own 
confession. (See Brief of Appellant at 11). 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations. Tollett v. 
Henderson 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.1 (d) 
(2d ed. 1987). In the instant case, plaintiff's guilty plea was 
upheld as voluntary by the Utah Court of Appeals. State v. 
Boren, No. 890328-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1989) (unpublished 
opinion) (see Appendix "A"; opinion). By pleading guilty, 
plaintiff waived any claim that information was illegally 
obtained by a Miranda violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully asks 
this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of plaintiff's 
petition. 
DATED this day of October, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
<L < ^ 
DAN R. 1ARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Kerry Rcjss 
Boren, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020, this^P^ day of 
October, 1990. 
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APPENDIX A 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
OCT 10/1989 
T Noontn j*4aw m
vfihfij ot1r» Court 
UMt C#oct •< App*«to 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Kerry Ross Boren, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890328-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Connie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bullock.1 
BULLOCK, Judge: 
Kerry Ross Boren appeals the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 
Boren was charged in 1983 with the second-degree murder of 
his wife. The information charging him was amended to include 
not only a charge for intentional second-degree murder under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1983), but also for 
second degree murder "acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life" as provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1983). At his arraignment, Boren 
waived a formal reading of the amended information and pleaded 
not guilty. 
Some time after Boren*s arraignment, his counsel discovered 
that the original information against him had been amended to 
include a charge under the "depraved indifference" subsection of 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1)(j) (1987). 
the statute defining second-degree murder. Boren and his counsel 
discussed the possibility of a plea bargain, and Boren reportedly 
refused to plead guilty to knowing or intentional murder. 
Borenfs counsel# however, called his attention to the possibility 
of pleading guilty to charges under the "depraved indifference-
subsection of the statute. 
On April 16, 1984, Boren appeared with his counsel before the 
district court, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding, and changed to 
guilty his plea to the charge of second-degree murder. In the 
ensuing colloquy, the principal focus was on the "depraved 
indifference" subsection: 
The Court: Your name is Kerry R. Boren, and 
I believe you are charged with murder in the 
second degree. 
Ms. Carter [Borenfs counsel]: Your honor, 
perhaps I could help the court. He is 
pleading under the depraved indifference 
section and not under either the "a" or "b" 
subsections. 
The Court: Is that agreeable with the state? 
Mr. Gunnarson [for the State]: Yes, your 
honor. 
The Court: By entering a plea of guilty, 
you do, in fact, admit the facts that 
support that charge. Do you understand 
that? That means the depraved indifference 
to human life. 
Mr. Boren: Yes, your honor. 
Boren then indicated, among other things, that he was 
literate in the English language, was without mental impairment, 
and that he understood his constitutional rights and the fact 
that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. The court pointed 
out potential sentences that could be imposed for the crime to 
which Boren was pleading, and then continued: 
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The Court: Mr. Boren, to the charge of 
criminal homicide, murder in the second 
degree, a first-degree felony, as I have 
explained it to you, which occurred at 34 
East Miller Avenue in Salt Lake County, 
state of Utah, on or about September 15, 
1983, in violation of title 76, chapter 6, 
section 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, in that you, Kerry R. Boren . . . 
caused the death of Elvia Boren—while 
acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life—engaged 
in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Elvia Boren. What now is your 
plea, guilty or not guilty? 
Mr. Boren: Guilty, your honor. 
The Court: Plea of guilty is received, and 
the court finds that it was freely and 
voluntarily made by the defendant, that he 
is not presently under the influence of any 
drugs, narcotics, or alcoholic beverages, 
nor has a physical or mental disability as 
such that interferes with his free choice to 
enter such a plea. I base those findings on 
my observations of the defendant here in the 
courtroom, together with the questions that 
were put to him and his responses thereto. 
At the hearing, Boren also signed an affidavit acknowledging 
his plea of guilty. The affidavit recited the elements of the 
offense as "acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, Defendant engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of another." The affidavit stated the facts as "I created 
a grave risk of death to my wife which resulted in her death by 
my lack of appropriate treatment and care.91 
In July of 1987, Boren moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
After an evidentiary hearing and review of the transcript of the 
hearing at which the plea was entered, the district court denied 
3 
the motion. Boren appeals, arguing that his guilty plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, or in conformity with Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e).2 
The entry of the guilty plea in this case occurred before the 
decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), which we 
do not apply retroactively. State v. Hickman. 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14 (Utah 1989); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988). We therefore review Boren*s motion to withdraw his plea 
to determine whether, based on the record as a whole, the plea 
was entered with full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights that Boren thereby waived. Brooks 
v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
309 (Utah 1985); see also Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 
18 (Utah 1989). 
Boren argues that it was not clear from the original 
proceedings that his plea of guilty was based exclusively on the 
depraved indifference portion of the second-degree murder 
statute, subsection 76-5-203(1)(c), and that his guilty plea was 
not based on a sufficient understanding of the elements of the 
crime as explained in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044-49 
(Utah 1984) and its progeny. As indicated above, however, the 
principal focus of the hearing at which Boren*s guilty plea was 
accepted was the depraved indifference subsection, and Boren*s 
affidavit clearly states the elements of depraved indifference 
murder. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we cannot 
conclude that Boren lacked adequate understanding of 
second-degree murder with depraved indifference, or that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying Boren*s motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
2. In a supplementary brief filed with this court, Boren also 
questions other procedures employed in the original proceedings 
against him. However, these arguments are not timely raised 
before this court, and do not appear to have been considered by 
the trial court. We therefore do not address them. Jolivet v. 
Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep 17, 19 (Utah 1989). 
4 
The denial of Borenfs motion to withdraw his plea of guilty 
is therefore affirmed. 
i . Robert Bullock, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
/£L^£^ig 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
APPENDIX B 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN (4865) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY ROSS BOREN, 
Petitioner, : ORDER 
v. : 
Case No. 890905823 
GARY W. DELAND, Utah State : 
Prison, Department of Corrections, Judge Scott Daniels 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument on 
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 12, 1990, at 
the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third 
District Court Judge. Petitioner was present representing 
himself. Respondent was represented by Dan R. Larsen, Assistant 
Attorney General. After hearing the arguments of the parties, 
reviewing the supplemental memorandums of law, and taking the 
matter under advisement, the Court filed a signed Minute Entry on 
March 9, 1990 ruling on the sole remaining issue as follows: 
Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(i) on the basis that his sentence was constitu-
tWXn 1230 
r\r\" o r * 
tionally defective where a copy of his presentence report was 
disclosed to his counsel but not to him prior to sentencing. A 
criminal defendant is entitled to review his presentence report 
and to rebut or correct matters in the report. State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). However, this right is not a 
fundamental right and may be waived counsel. See e.g., State v. 
Butterfield, 123 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah Dec. 27, 1989). It is 
undisputed that petitioner's counsel was provided a copy of the 
presentence report and given an opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy of the report. Accordingly, petitioner's right to 
personally review and rebut the presentence report was waived by 
counsel. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. 
DATED this <y7 day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-2-
r\r\ * *">•** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Kerry Ross Boren, 
pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this<2_ day of 
March, 1990. /) 
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